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CASENOTE
Which Right is Right: The Pueblo
Water Rights Doctrine Meets Prior
Appropriation
The New Mexico Court of Appeals decided State ex rel. Martinez
v. City of Las Vegas' on July 15, 1994. The case was the latest incarnation
of litigation started in 1978 to determine the extent of the pueblo water
rights adjudicated to the City of Las Vegas, New Mexico, in Cartwrightv.
Public Service Company of New Mexico.2 Speaking through Judge Apodaca,3 the court evaluated the historical record of the doctrine, concluded
that the New Mexico Supreme Court would overrule Cartwright I if the
issue were before it, and held that the city was not entitled to pueblo
water rights.4 While the court of appeals was on solid substantive
ground in its decision, the procedural issues raised by its holding lead to
uncertainty in the law. The New Mexico Supreme Court should use this
case to settle those procedural issues and overrule CartwrightI, purging
the doctrine of pueblo water rights from New Mexico law.'
Water in New Mexico, as elsewhere in the Southwest, is crucial
to economic development. Municipalities wishing to grow or expand
1. 880 P.2d 868 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
2. 343 P.2d 654 (N.M. 1958) [hereinafter Cartwright I].
3. Now Chief Judge of the New Mexico Court of Appeals.
4. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 868-69.
5. As of this writing, the New Mexico Supreme Court had granted certiorari and
scheduled oral arguments in State ex rel. Martinez. At the request of the parties, however,
the court vacated the arguments pending a negotiated settlement of the dispute between the
State and the City. Nevertheless, the supreme court can still rule on the merits if the parties
settle. In First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Sanchez, 815 P.2d 613 (N.M. 1991), the court
issued an opinion "for precedential value alone," Id. at 622, because while it was preparing
its opinion in final form, the parties settled the matter. Id.
Even if the litigants reach a settlement, the court should issue an opinion to settle New
Mexico law, since the procedural and substantive issues raised in this case would benefit
from guidance from the supreme court. Should the court decline to publish an opinion, the
procedural issues raised here with regard to the holding in State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d 1175
(N.M. 1994), will remain unresolved until another case raises them. See discussion below.
Furthermore, the status of the pueblo water rights doctrine would remain uncertain.
Litigants cannot agree on issues of law. Neither the state nor the city has the power to
determine the fate of the pueblo water rights doctrine in New Mexico. Potential litigants
need to know whether Cartwright I or State ex rel. Martinez would control similar issues
raised in the future. By deciding State ex rel. Martinez, regardless of the settlement position
of the parties, the court would act in the name of certainty and efficiency in the law.
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need to assure that they have a reliable supply of water to sustain that
growth. The City of Las Vegas in eastern New Mexico is no exception.
For several decades, Las Vegas has litigated to secure its water rights,
either directly or through agents.' In a controversial 1958 New Mexico
Supreme Court ruling, the court adjudicated to the city a pueblo water
right, thus giving it unlimited access to the waters of the Gallinas River,
which flows through the city.7 The doctrine of pueblo water rights holds
that a municipality or pueblo that is a successor to a Spanish or Mexican
colonization grant has a paramount right to waters of nonnavigable
streams flowing through the grant.6 'The quantity of water guaranteed
by this right increases in time with the expanding size, population, and
needs of the successor community."9 The Cartwright I court found the
City of Las Vegas to be the successor to the pueblo Nuestra Senora de
Las Dolores de Las Vegas, an 1835 community land grant from the
Mexican government which the United States Congress confirmed in
1860.0 In 1978, the state began proceedings to clarify the extent of the
city's rights.1 The most recent appeal in this litigation is the subject of
this casenote.
The 1978 litigation has gone through two appeals. The first was
in 1990, affirming the denial of motions for summary judgment and
allowing the trial court to hear evidence as to the historical validity of the
pueblo water rights doctrine." The second, resulting in the present
decision, was from a district court's partial final judgment defining the

6. See The Acequia Madre de Las Vegas v. Gallinas Canal, Water Storage and Irrigation
Co., San Miguel County District Court No. 8142 (1922) (the Gallinas Decree); United States
v. Hope Community Ditch Co., United States District Court No. 712 Equity (1933); State ex
rel. Erickson v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, San Miguel County District Court No.
15,219 (1954); Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 343 P.2d 654 (N.M. 1958)
[hereinafter Cartwright 11; Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 362 P.2d 796
(N.M. 1961) [hereinafter Cartwright 11); City of Las Vegas v. Oman, 796 P.2d 1121 (N.M. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 795 P.2d 87 (N.M. 1990).
7. CartwrightI, 343 P.2d 654.
8. Iris H.W. Engstrand, Introduction to DANIEL TYLER, THE MYrHICAL PUEBLO RIGHTS
DOCRINE: WATER ADMIN5"TRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MsIxco 1 (1990).
9. Anastasia S. Stevens, Pueblo Water Rights in New Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 535

(1988).
10. See Cartwright I, 343 P.2d at 658, 667; Oman, 796 P.2d at 1124; Maese v. Herman, 183
U.S. 572 (1902). Note, however, that there is the possibility for dispute of that claim. See
Cartwright 1, 343 P.2d at 686, 689-90 (dissenting opinion); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis,
Nos. 20294 and 22600 Consolidated, slip op. at 2 (5th Jud. D. Chaves County, N.M. Dec. 29,
1992) (the latest district court pronouncement in this case, entering no judgment on whether
the city is the successor to a colonization grant.) Note also the silence of the court of appeals
on this issue in State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d 868 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
11. City of Las Vegas v. Oman, 796 P.2d 1121, 1127 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 795 P.2d
87 (N.M. 1990).
12. Oman, 796 P.2d at 1121.
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limits of the city's right. 3 In its appeal from that ruling, the state urged
the court of appeals to declare the pueblo water rights doctrine invalid. 1
The city argued that the validity issue was not before the court and urged
the court to overturn the restrictions on the city's rights which the district
court had imposed. 5 The court of appeals did not address those
restrictions, instead ruling directly on the pueblo water rights doctrine. 6
Procedural and substantive reasoning guided the court of appeals
in State ex rel. Martinez. Procedurally, an intermediate court of appeals
cannot overturn a decision of the state's highest court. New Mexico law
abides by this principle as much as other courts in the nation. 7 Yet the
court of appeals viewed the recent New Mexico Supreme Court decision
in State v. Wilson's as granting it the freedom "to decline to uphold the
pueblo water rights doctrine as established in Cartwright L"' The
language of Wilson, however, does not seem to support such an expansive
view of its holding. Therefore, the New Mexico Supreme Court should
review this case to clarify the Wilson holding.
Substantively, the overwhelming weight of modem historical
authority on Spanish and Mexican water rights persuaded the court of
appeals that the doctrine should not continue to exist in New Mexico. 2°
The CartwrightI court imported the doctrine from California law. But an
analysis more correctly based on principles of Spanish and Mexican law
reveals that the pueblo water rights doctrine is historically invalid and
lacks modem scholarly support. Moreover, the doctrine directly conflicts
with fundamental constitutional property rights and with the law of prior
appropriation and beneficial use. In addition to resolving procedural
uncertainty, then, the New Mexico Supreme Court should use this case
to overrule the CartwrightI holding that brought pueblo water rights to
New Mexico.

13. State ex rel. Reynolds, Nos. 20294 and 22600 Consolidated, slip op. at 2.
14. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 869.
15. Id. See also Appellant's Brief-in-Chief.
16. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 868-69.
17. Taylor Mattis, Precedential Value of Decisions of the Court of Appeals of the State of New
Mexico, 22 N.M. L. REV. 535, 547-48 (1992).
18. 867 P.2d 1175 (1994).
19. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 870.
20. Id.
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The ProceduralHurdle: Oman, Alexander, and their legacy
The first appeal of the 1978 litigation was in City of Las Vegas v.
Oman.21 In the district court, both the city and the state filed cross
motions for partial summary judgment based upon res judicata arguments.' The city relied on Cartwright I while the state looked to the
Gallinas DecreeP for legal support.24 The court denied both motions,
and the court of appeals then denied motions for interlocutory appeal.'
The New Mexico Supreme Court, at the city's request, granted a writ of
superintending control and remanded the case for consideration by the
court of appeals. 6 Oman was thus a procedural appeal, not an appeal
from an adverse judgment decided on the merits. The present case came
up on appeal from litigation in the district court that followed the Oman
remand.
Two developments in New Mexico case law allowed the court of
appeals to decline to follow the Cartwright I precedent in State ex rel.
Martinez. First, the Oman court allowed the district court on remand to
hear testimony as to the Validity of the pueblo water rights doctrine. 7
Second, the court of appeals read the supreme court in State v. Wilson'6
as granting it some latitude in contributing to the development of case
law in New Mexico.
The Oman court held that stare decisis prevented it from
addressing the validity of the pueblo water rights doctrine in New
Mexico." The court found itself constrained not only by the Cartwright
I decision, but also by an unrelated case which restricted the court of
appeals in its interpretation of the law. In Alexander v. Delgado,'"the
New Mexico Supreme Court admonished the court of appeals for
straying too far from the principles of appellate review. Alexander dealt
primarily with the tort defense of unavoidable accident, which, although
questioned, had been reaffirmed on several occasions by the supreme

21. 796 P.2d 1121 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
22. Id. at 1123.
23. Named after the 1922 litigation of water rights in the Gallinas river. See The Acequia
Madre de Las Vegas v. Gallinas Canal, Water Storage and Irrigation Co., San Miguel County
District Court No. 8142 (1922).
24. 796 P.2d at 1123.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1131.
28. 867 P.2d 1175 (N.M. 1994).
29. Oman, 796 P.2d at 1123.
30. 507 P.2d 778 (N.M. 1973).

Spring 1995]

PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE

court.?3' When the court of appeals heard Alexander, it abolished the
defense, thus overruling sixteen supreme court cases and a uniform jury
instruction.32
The supreme court was not happy with this action. It first noted
New Mexico constitutional and statutory provisions which dearly placed
the court of appeals under superintending control of the supreme
court.' The court then stated that "Iqluiteapart from [those provisions],
it is not considered good form for a lower court to reverse a superior one.
Such actions are unsettling in the law which we ought to strive to make
certain, and result in a disorderly judicial process."" The supreme court
upheld the holding of the court of appeals, finding the reasoning of the
lower court "above reproach. " But it did so only after establishing
clear lines of appellate authority, and holding that the court of appeals,
in its rulings, was tightly constrained by supreme court precedent.
Against this background, the Oman court paid particular attention to stare
decisis.
The Oman court nevertheless recognized that "tihere is a good
deal of dispute among contemporary scholars regarding the historical
6 It accordvalidity of pueblo water rights as described in Cartwright 1"
ingly allowed the district court on remand to hear testimony addressing
that validity, 7 finding this procedural step important to the development of case law in New Mexico:
We do not interpret Alexander to preclude development of an
adequate record at trial to allow reconsideration of a precedent
on appeal. If Alexander were interpreted otherwise, development of case law would be inhibited. We believe the supreme
court's ability to develop case law will be best served if, when
a district court makes a preliminary determination that the
supreme court might reconsider one of its prior decisions, the
district court is permitted to allow an offer of proof or
otherwise permit the development of an adequate record.'
The supreme court denied certiorari in Oman.?

31. Id. at 778-79.
32. Id. at 779.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 780.
36. Oman, 796 P.2d at 1130.
37. Id. at 1131.
38. Id.
39. 795 P.2d 87 (N.M. 1990). A denial of certiorari is neutral as to the court's opinion of
the law expressed in the case below. See, e.g., State v. Cutnose, 532 P. 2d 889, 893 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1975) (Sutin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled on other grounds
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On remand from Oman, the district court "declined to address the
validity of the pueblo rights doctrine."O But, following its Oman
mandate, the court allowed the parties to present evidence as to the
validity of the doctrine.41 At the end of the trial, the district court ruled
that the city could use the waters of the Gallinas in an amount "reasonably necessary to meet [its] present and future needs." The court,
however, severely limited that claim by holding that the city could only
use the water for ordinary non-industrial municipal uses within the city
limits, that it could not sell the Gallinas water to consumers outside the
city limits, and that it further did not have the right to store the water
diverted from the Gallinas river under the pueblo rights doctrine.' In
addition, the court refused to rule on either the validity of the doctrine
or the issue of succession to the original Las Vegas grant." Both the
state and the city appealed.
by State v. McCormack, 674 P.2d 1117 (N.M. 1984). Thus no approval of Oman can be
inferred by this denial.
40. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868, 869 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
41. Id.
42. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, Nos. 20294 and 22600 Consolidated, slip op. at 2 (5th
Jud. D. Chaves County, N.M. Dec. 29, 1992).
43. Id. The court also ruled that possible reuse of effluent from the city's use of Gallinas
water did not fall within the pueblo water rights doctrine, and thus was controlled by
Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 654 P.2d 537 (N.M. 1982), which held that a city could use its
effluent as it saw fit, providing that a change of use did not impair the existing rights of
others. Id. at 539. In addition, the court held that the city could not extend a pueblo water
right to the underground waters of the Taylor Well Field, since use of such waters is
governed by the Templeton doctrine, which holds that an appropriator of surface water may
successfully apply to drill wells to fulfill that appropriation so long as those wells do not
impact on existing water rights of others. Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy
Dist., 332 P.2d 465, 471 (N.M. 1958). The trial court, while constrained by Cartwright I to
uphold the city's pueblo water right, nonetheless limited that right to the court's
understanding of what such a right might have been in 1835.
44. While the trial court heard evidence on the issues, it found itself bound by Cartwright
I:

Based on the binding effect of the pueblo water right doctrine articulated
by the Supreme Court in Cartwright v. Public Service Co., the Court refuses
the tender of the state and the counter-tender of the city, and enters no
judgment on the validity of the doctrine. The Court likewise refuses the
tender of the state and the counter-tender of the city, and enters no
judgment, on whether the city is the successor to a colonization grant and
became the beneficiary of the pueblo water right.
This Partial Final Judgment determines all the city's claims of right to use
the surface and ground waters of the Pecos River stream system under the
pueblo water rights doctrine.
State ex rel. Reynolds, Nos. 20294 and 22600 Consolidated, slip op. at 2-3.
It is clear from this holding, therefore, that no court, subsequent to Cartwright I, has
adjudicated the validity of the pueblo water right based upon new historical evidence
presented at trial. See infra note 106.
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A second procedurally important decision came in early 1994
when the supreme court decided State v. Wilson.' In Wilson the court
of appeals certified a question on uniform jury instructions to the
supreme court.* Uniform jury instructions in New Mexico are mandatory when adopted by the supreme court through a general order and,
before Wilson, could not be questioned by the court of appeals.' But the
Wilson court held that the court of appeals had "authority to question
uniform jury instructions in cases in which the instruction ha[d] not been
challenged previously and to amend, modify, or abolish the instruction
if it [was] erroneous."' The Wilson opinion thus created two branches
of appellate review of jury instructions in New Mexico. In the first branch
are the traditional concepts of review, where the court of appeals must
follow supreme court decisions when the supreme court has reaffirmed
jury instructions subsequent to their initial promulgation. In the second
are the cases similar to Wilson, where the supreme court does not confirm
an instruction subsequent to that instruction's adoption. There the court
of appeals may amend, modify, or abolish that instruction.49
The court of appeals in this case interpreted Wilson to mean that
when a common law precedent has not been subsequently affirmed by
the supreme court, the court of appeals has the latitude to decline to
follow that precedent. Wilson allows court of appeals review of jury
instructions not affirmed since their adoption.' Since jury instructions
are presumptively "correct statements of law",51 it could logically follow
that the same review principle applies to other supreme court-determined
law. The court of appeals' language case indicates that this logic could
have guided Judge Apodaca. As his opinion points out, "in the thirty-six
years that have elapsed since Cartwright I was decided, our Supreme
Court has not reaffirmed or even reviewed the validity of the pueblo
rights doctrine." It is true that the uniformly critical commentaries on
the doctrine also eased the court's task in declaring it invalid,' and that
the court's holding seems to hinge on its conclusion that the supreme
court would overrule CartwrightI if it had the chance.' Yet the court's
interpretation of Wilson does not depend on the substantive merits of the
pueblo water rights doctrine. Rather, the court contains its analysis of
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

867 P.2d 1175 (N.M. 1994).
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id. at 1178.
Id.
Id. at 1177-78.
Id. at 1178.
State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868, 870 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
Id.
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Wilson to its procedural implications when read in conjunction with
Alexander. In that analysis, the court of appeals finds that Wilson applies
to all case law in New Mexico, not just unaffirmed jury instructions.
It appears that the court read the Wilson language expansively.
In its discussion of Wilson, the court of appeals focused on that opinion's
modification of Alexander, concluding that Wilson freed the court of
appeals from Alexander's constraints. The court was careful to say that
despite its holding, it still considered itself bound by supreme court
precedent.' Yet, in construing Wilson as permitting it to break from the
Cartwright I precedent, the court of appeals made a distinction without
a difference. When a lower court does not apply the law of a superior
court's precedent, the lower court has acted as if not bound by that
precedent.
The conclusions the court of appeals drew from its reading of
Wilson seem at odds with the language of Wilson. While the court broadly
construed Wilson to apply to all case law, a close reading of Wilson shows
that its holding is restricted to jury instructions and does not extend to
case law precedent.' The Wilson court did not group uniform jury
instructions in the same category as other case law precedent. Rather, the
court considered the promulgation of the instructions as "establish[ing]
a presumption that the instructions are correct statements of law. "57
Such a presumption, the court made clear, is rebuttable by the court of
appeals when it is the first court to review the instructions after their
promulgation.' The holding of Wilson is unambiguous: "[W]e hold that
the Court of Appeals has authority to question uniform jury instructions
in cases in which the instruction has not been challenged previously and
to amend, modify, or abolish the instruction if it is erroneous. "
Several factors could have influenced the court of appeals'
understanding of Wilson. One is a key sentence from Wilson itself.
Although Wilson was explicit in its reference to jury instructions, both as
the subject of the opinion and as a separate category of law, Justice
Ransom, author of the Wilson opinion, seemed to open the door to a
broader construction when he said: "[flurther, this Court encourages the
Court of Appeals to express its rationale for any reservations it might
harbor over Supreme Court precedent. "' The use of the general word
"precedent" instead of the more restrictive "jury instructions" might have
led the court of appeals to its expansive conclusions. In addition, the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
See State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d at 1177-78.
Id. at 1178.
The presumption "alone is not sufficient to tie the hands of the court of appeals." Id.
Id,
Id.
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rationale in Wilson specifically referred to Alexander,'1 and Alexander
ruled that a court of appeals is governed by supreme court precedent."
The court of appeals here construed Wilson as explicitly modifying
Alexander.' Alexander has long stood for broad principles of appellate
review; the court of appeals could therefore have interpreted the Wilson
modification of Alexander as extending to appellate review in general.
Furthermore, since jury instructions are statements of substantive law, a
holding affecting jury instructions could also logically affect the underlying law. Finally, persuasive federal case law indicates that both in the
state and federal system, courts of appeals may sometimes rule contrary
to supreme court precedent."

61. Id. at 1175.
62. See Alexander v. Delgado, 507 P.2d 778 (N.M. 1973); accord State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d
at 1175. It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the ramifications of the Alexander
doctrine. At the time of this writing, at least 146 opinions and 9 law review articles mention
or discuss Alexander.
63. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868, 870 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
64. The court of appeals relies on Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American Airlines,
Inc., 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984). State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 870. In Indianapolis
Airport, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Posner, used the
following language:
[just as an intermediate federal appellate court may properly decline to
follow a U.S. Supreme Court decision when convinced that the Court
would overrule the decision if it had the opportunity to do so, see, e.g.,
Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 902-04 (7th Cir. 1982); Browder v.
Gayle, 142 F.Supp. 707,717 (M.D. Ala.) (three judge court), a)fd per curiam,
352 U.S. 903 (1956); United States v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760, 765 (1st Cir.
1945) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), so may intermediate
state appellate courts decline to follow earlier state supreme court decisions
for the same reason-especially when almost a century has passed since
the earlier decisions. And if we think the intermediate state appellate court
has made a correct or even, perhaps, just a defensible prediction of what
the state supreme court would do if the question were put to it, then we
are bound to follow its ruling in a diversity case or any other case where
the issue is one of State law.
733 F.2d at 1272.
Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899 (7th. Cir. 1982), addressed somewhat the same issue
in the framework of interpretation of Supreme Court decisions. While the Norris court was
circumscribed in its language, the court indicated that looking at past decisions is not
necessarily the most reliable method for deciding current law:
Ordinarily the best predictor of how a Court will decide an issue in a
future case is how it decided the same issue in a past case, and when that
is so the law is what is stated in the earlier decision. But sometimes laterdecisions, though not explicitly overruling or even mentioning an earlier
decision, indicate that the Court very probably will not decide the issue in
the same way the next time. In such a case, to continue to follow the
earlier case blindly until it is formally overruled is to apply the dead, not
the living, law.
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The interpretation of the Wilson holding in this case leads to
uncertainty in the law. The court of appeals read Wilson as applying to
all supreme court precedent, not just jury instructions promulgated by the
supreme court. Yet the Wilson court was careful to distinguish uniform
jury instructions from usual case law precedent. The two views are
directly at odds. If the court of appeals applied too broad a reading of
Wilson, the supreme court needs to explain the Wilson holding and correct
the impact Wilson will have when read with this court of appeals opinion.
If the court of appeals correctly interpreted Wilson, then the supreme
court needs to issue a mandate clarifying its holding in Wilson, ensuring
that the court of appeals will uniformly apply supreme court-made law.
The need to accurately apply precedent cuts across all areas of substantive law. Clear leadership from the supreme court will not only determine the fate of the pueblo water rights doctrine, it will foster stability
and predictability in New Mexico case law. The supreme court should
thus review State ex. Tel Martinez v. City of Las Vegas to reconcile the
procedural problems it raised.
The Substantive Hurdle
The CartwrightI dissent: Pueblo Water Rights are off to a shaky start
Cartwright I was a controversial decision from birth. The opinion
included a heated dissent by Justices Federici and McGhee.' Justice
Federici, then a district court judge sitting by designation, authored the
dissent and outlined the problems of incorporating the pueblo water
rights doctrine into New Mexico law."
Justice Federici first found fault with the majority's use of
scholarly authority. The Clesson S. Kinney treatise relied on by Justice
Sadler and the majority' discussed the pueblo water rights doctrine
only by reporting California court decisions, not by explaining why the
doctrine ought to be valid in other western states.' Justice Federici then
took pains to point out that "even Kinney... speaks of [plueblo [water]

Id. at 904.
While the Norrislanguage is less on point than IndianapolisAirport, since there essentially
were no later decisions interpreting Cartwright I until this case, the opinion nevertheless
lends weight to the idea that appellate courts should not merely rule according to precedent
when that precedent is an old opinion that is extensively doubted as good law.
65. CartumightI, 343 P.2d at 670.
66. For a clear discussion of Cartwright I written at the time it was decided, see Robert
Emmet Clark, The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 35 N.M. HIST. REv. 265 (1960).
67. Clesson S. Kinney, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS (2d ed.
1912).
68. CartwrightI, 343 P.2d at 674-75.
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[Nights as compared to riparian rights and not as compared to rights
acquired under the [dioctrine of prior appropriation. " 6
The dissent referred to another flaw in the majority's rationale, the
statement that the "colonization pueblos to which the right attached were
largely, if indeed, not always, established before there was any settlement
of the area." 7' Justice Federici substantiated that when the pueblo antecedent to the City of Las Vegas was founded, there were already settlers in the
area, directly contrary to the majority's assertion.'
Third, the dissent demonstrated that the Plan of Pitic n a 1783
grant relied on by California courts in establishing pueblo water rights for
Los Angeles, did not include in its scope the type of expanding water right
that the majority had awarded to the City of Las Vegas. 73 Furthermore,
Justice Federici argued that the Plan of Pitic awarded rights to water that
included irrigation, 74 and could not be interpreted to "give preference to
domestic users of water rather than to other users,' h thereby precluding
irrigators in the area from sharing in the city's water right.76
In addition, Justice Federici examined the California rationale in
ruling in favor of the existence of a pueblo water right, and concluded that
those decisions were driven by reasons other than analysis of Mexican laws
in effect at the time of grants of water rights.77 The Cartwright I dissent
argued that the seminal case on California's adoption of pueblo water
rights, Lux v. Haggin, 8 "did not and could not apply the Mexican Pueblo
Water Rights Doctrine,"" but instead created a pueblo water rights
doctrine particular to California's circumstances.'
69. Id.

70. Id. at 665-70.
71. Id. at 675-76.
72. 1782 Document establishing the Sonoran town of Pitic, setting boundaries and
discussing land and water uses. The plan was to have force not only in Pitic, but in all
subsequent Spanish communities in the Southwest. Iris H.W. Engstrand, A Note on the Plan
of Pitic,3 COLONIAL LATIN AM. HIS. REV. 73,74 (1994); see also MIcHAEL C. MEYER, WATER
IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHES, A SOcIAL AND LEGAL HSTORY, 1550-1850, 112, 158 (1984);
DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO WATER RicTSI DOCrRINE: WATER ADMNSTRATION
IN HISPANIc NEw MEsxco 15 (1990).
73. Cartwright I, 343 P.2d at 676-77.
74. The plaintiffs in CartwrightI included about 100 users of surface water from the
Gallinas River. Clark, supra note 66, at 265.
75. Cartwright1,343 P.2d at 687.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 688.
78. 4 P. 919 (Cal. 1886) (en banc).
79. Cartwright I, 343 P.2d at 688.
80. Id. The dissent explains:
Los Angeles, being thwarted by the courts in her attempts to expropriate
all the waters of the Los Angeles river, then went to the legislature and
after legislation was adopted favorable to the municipality the statutes
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Fifth, Justice Federici maintained that the pueblo water rights
doctrine as embraced by the majority was in violation of the Pecos River
Compact, which mandates that New Mexico apply the doctrine of prior
appropriation in its water law.8' Since the compact "has the full force and
effect of law comparable to a treaty,""2 it is binding on New Mexico and
cannot be affected by court adjudication of rights to a tributary of the Pecos
River.
Finally, the dissent addressed the conflict between the doctrine
adopted by the majority and New Mexico's water law, first recognizing the
constitutional and statutory provisions for applying prior appropriation
and beneficial use in New Mexico.' Noting that the city successfully
asserted a right which, if valid, had lain dormant for over one hundred
years, Justice Federici argued that "there is no provision [in the constitution
or statutes] for a municipality to reserve water rights for a period of over
one hundred years before the rights are applied to beneficial use.""u
The court of appeals' review of CartwrightI
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in holding that the city was not
entitled to pueblo water rights, essentially revisited CartwrightL The court
first analyzed the authority relied by the CartwrightI majority, including
treatises and California case law, then discussed the results of modem
scholarship on the doctrine of pueblo water rights. Third, the court
examined the incompatibility of pueblo water rights with prior appropria-

were upheld although the courts prior to such legislation had refused to
uphold the claims of Los Angeles to the water,
Id.
81. Id. at 690.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 694.
84. Id. Justice Federici authored another dissenting opinion, when the court denied a
Motion for Rehearing. Cartwrght 1,343 P.2d at 696. In that dissent, Justice Federici excruciatingly elaborated on the conflicts between pueblo water rights and the doctrine of prior
appropriation and beneficial use. Justice Federici then argued that even if the antecedent
pueblo to the City of Las Vegas had an expanding right, claiming water not yet put into use,
that right could not have survived the transition from Mexican to United States sovereignty,
since it was an inchoate right by virtue of its not being vested, or "fixed, accrued, settled,
absolute." Cartwright 1, 343 P.2d at 704 (Federici, J., dissenting) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.). He further illustrated, citing United States Supreme Court precedent,
that inchoate non-vested rights, when confirmed by Congress, "became American titles, and
took their legal validity wholly from the act of confirmation, and not from any French or
Spanish element which entered into their previous existence." Id. at 705. Thus even if
Spanish or Mexican law implied a pueblo water right, such a right could not have survived
the change in sovereign when New Mexico became a United States territory and later a
state.
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tion. Finally, the court considered the city's claim of reliance on the doctrine
as a means of converting the doctrine into a rule of property.s
The court of appeals' opinion concluded that the treatises
discussed in Cartwright I do not provide a proper basis for an inquiry
into the pueblo water rights doctrine. The court found the same flaw with
those treatises that the CartwrightI dissent found, namely, that none of
the treatises "cited to any original Spanish and Mexican sources of law on
M The court therefore turned to the
the subject of pueblo water rights.""
California cases that decreed a pueblo water right8 to find the proper
"historical basis [for the right] on which Cartwright I relied."I
The first California case to speak of pueblo water rights was Lux
v. HagginI" a supreme court decision which mentioned the doctrine in
dicta. 9' Lux implied the existence of a pueblo's best right to the use of
water from nonnavigable rivers partly from analogy to an 1860 California
land case awarding title to San Francisco as the successor to a pueblo.'
In addition, Lux relied on a quotation by the Spanish scholar Joaquin
Escriche, who said that a pueblo inhabitant might use water from a river
so long as it was done "without prejudice to the common use or destiny
which the pueblo shall have given the waters."' The Lux court also
examined the Plan of Pitic in speaking on water rights of a pueblo."
The court of appeals in this case discussed the flaws of Lux and
the line of cases that adopted its holding. The court noted that "the Lux
dicta was then formally adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles,'" adding that after Vernon
Irrigation, pueblo water rights took hold in California jurisprudence
through reaffirmation of the doctrine without additional historical
authority to support it.9- The court also echoed the same concerns with
an analysis of the Plan of Pitic that Justice Federici indirectly raised in

85. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868,870-76 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
86. Id. at 871. Compare Cartwright , 343 P.2d at 671-73.
87. An articulate exposition of the California origins of the pueblo water rights doctrine
appears in a recent article by Peter L. Reich, Mission Revival Jurisprudence:State Courts and
Hispanic Water Law Since 1850,69 WASH. L REV. 869 (1994). Professor Reich forcefully argues
that the doctrine is completely spurious: "[indeveloping a jurisprudence of Hispanic water
rights, southwestern state courts deliberately distorted historic communal water sharing in
favor of municipal exclusivity and riparian irrigation." Id. at 923.
88. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 871.
89. 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886) (en banc).
90. Id. at 713-17.
91. Id. at 714-15.
92. Id. at 716.
93. Id. at 714.
94. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 871.
95. Id.
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Cartwright I,* namely that the "Plan of Pitic only dealt with water
distribution within a pueblo and not with a pueblo's water rights as
against non-pueblo users.' 47 Furthermore, as in Cartwright I's dissent,
the court found that section 7 of the Plan called for a sharing of water
with others who resided outside the pueblo, including natives." The
court therefore concluded that the Plan of Pitic cannot serve as the basis
for the pueblo rights doctrine." The court did not discount Escriche's
writings, finding that Escriche enjoys a widely held credible reputation. 1 The court recognized, however, that the single quote from
Escriche used in Lux, uncorroborated by any other pre-1848 writings and
ably countered by modem scholarship, is too slender a reed on which to
base the pueblo water rights doctrine."°
The conclusions of modern scholarship on the doctrine of pueblo water
rights
The court of appeals next addressed post Cartwright I historical
research and analysis and found that modem authority is unified in
asserting the invalidity of the pueblo water rights doctrine.' The
parties at trial took divergent approaches to litigating the issues. The state
introduced expert testimony arguing against the validity of the pueblo
water rights doctrine.'1 4 The city, on the other hand, did not refute the
state's evidence on the doctrine with its own experts but relied on the
doctrine's validity as established in Cartwright I and "reaffirmed in
California in City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando.""~Consequently,
the only evidence before the trial court as to the validity of the doctrine
came from the state's experts."6

96. Cartwright I, 343 P.2d at 687-88.
97. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 872.
98. CartwrightI, 343 P.2d at 687.
99. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 872.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 873.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 874.
104. Id. at 868.
105. Id. at 871 (citing City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (CaL
1975).
106. Obviously, there are two possibilities as to why the city did not offer expert
testimony of its own on the validity of the pueblo water rights doctrine. The first is that the
city chose to rely on Cartwright I exclusively, confident that stare dedsis would suffice to
quiet the state's claim as to the invalidity of the doctrine. The more likely possibility,
however, is that there is no expert opinion that would support the city's position. An
exhaustive survey of the historical basis for the existence or non-existence of an expanding
water right is beyond the scope of this note. But the parties in this litigation surely did not
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The court of appeals recognized that the grant of land to a pueblo
implicated the grant of water necessary to support that land." Scholars
even acknowledge that under Mexican law, an increase in a pueblo's size
"could lead to an increase in the pueblo's water allocation."1" But
allocation or adjudication was the mechanism for that increase, and there
was an obligation in the allocation to protect the rights of junior water
users."° Municipalities could not exclude other users from rights to
flowing water; both law and custom required sharing."0 Nowhere in
the literature is there historical authority for an expanding right that does
not come into effect through allocation or does not protect to some extent
the rights of other users.
All authorities cited by the court of appeals explain that the
pueblo water right' as adjudicated in Cartwright I had no historical
precedent in Spanish or Mexican law."' One authority mentioned by
the court of appeals, Daniel Tyler, presents perhaps the best synopsis of
the issue:
After reviewing extant Hispanic documents of New Mexico,
the only supportable conclusion is that no municipal entity,
Indian or non-Indian, had a right to enlarge its claim to water
without consideration of the legitimate needs of other users,
individuals, or communities. Equitable, or proportional,
distribution was the objective, and although this might seem
idealistic when viewed from today's perspective, both Spaniards and Mexicans developed a system of sharing which they
hoped would function in avoidance of costly litigation.
Absolute water rights were inconsistent with Spanish thinking
and inappropriate to the New Mexican environment. Thus, the
pueblo [water] rights doctrine can only be seen as unhistorical
and fictitious-an invention of modern minds that failed to

spare any resources in trying to substantiate the historical support for their respective
positions.
The court of appeals opinion in this case does not once cite expert trial testimony,
relying instead on published scholarly authority on the doctrine. Perhaps the trial court's
refusal of the city's tender of evidence as to the validity of the doctrine dictated the court
of appeals' approach. See supra note 44. The result is that the actual practices of water use
of Hispanic settlers, as revealed by modem authority, have not been adjudicated in this case.
107. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 873.
108. Id. See also CHARLES T. DUMARs ET AL., PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS 30-31 (1984);
MEYER, supra note 72, at 136-37 (1984).
109. See DUMARS ET AL., supra note 108, at 30; MEYER, supra note 72, at 135.
110. TYLER, supra note 72, at 14-15.
111. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 72, at 45; Stevens, supra note 9, at 535; Engstrand, supra
note 8, at 1; Jefferson E. LeCates, Water Law-The Effect of Acts of the Sovereign on the Pueblo
Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 8 NAT. RESOURCS J. 727, 731, 736 (1968); MALCOM EBRIGHT,

LAND GRANTS AND LAwsurrs INNORTHERN NEW MExaco 196 (1994).
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read the record
left by the Spanish and Mexican people of
New Mexico. 112
Lack of historical support for the doctrine correctly guided the
court of appeals' holding. The history of New Mexico's birth as a United
States territory plays a pivotal role in the pueblo water rights controversy. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo governed New Mexico's transition
from the Mexican to the United States sovereign. The treaty recognized
all existing rights vested at the time of its ratification, 113 and any
property rights vested before the treaty remained unchanged after its
ratification."' If the pueblo Nuestra Seftora de Las Dolores de Las
Vegas did not have an expanding water right before the treaty, then the
sole source for existence of such a right would be the laws of the
Territory, and later the State of New Mexico. Neither the Territory nor
the State, however, had ever, until Cartwright I, acknowledged the
existence of an expanding pueblo water right. Thus, the source of the
City of Las Vegas' right could only be the laws and practices predating
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which uniformly substantiate that such
a right was unknown under then-existing law. The circular nature of the
inquiry is further evidence of the illegitimacy of the existence of a pueblo
water right in New Mexico.
The conflict between pueblo water rights and prior appropriation
The court of appeals also correctly placed importance on the
conflict between the doctrine and New Mexico water law. New Mexico,
like other Western states, follows the doctrine of prior appropriation and
beneficial use. Under that doctrine, a right to water awarded to a user
can only vest if the user diverts the water from its source and puts the
water to beneficial use."5 Moreover, the time lapse between a municipality's appropriation of water and vesting of the right through beneficial
use cannot exceed forty years." 6 If the owner of a water right "ceases
using water beneficially for long enough, the water becomes available to
other appropriators."" 7 Any unappropriated water belongs to the

112.
113.
Feb. 2,
114.
115.

TYLER, supra note 72, at 45.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement,
1848, U.S.-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 5.
For a short and useful discussion of New Mexico water law, see Charles T. DuMars,

New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of Current Issues, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J.
1045 (1982).

116. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Michie 1994).
117. DuMars, supra note 115, at 1045.
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public;"' in this way no water in New Mexico is free for the taking.
The pueblo water right prevents other vested appropriators from using
water to the limit of their appropriation."9 It follows, therefore, that a
pueblo water right clashes with prior appropriation law.
The constitutional issue
While the court of appeals made no mention of the constitutional
issue raised by Cartwright I, implicit in the pueblo water rights controversy is the issue of the taking of a property right without just compensation. The city's increased use, without compensation to existing owners,
of the water it uses now but did not use in the past, is a clear example
of an unconstitutional taking prohibited by the United States and New
Mexico constitutions.'"'
On the surface, Cartwright I involved nothing more than
adjudication of water rights between users of the same stream. Las Vegas,
acting through its agent, asserted one claim, the plaintiffs another. The
litigants called on the supreme court to decide the question. The parties
had competing rights, and the determination of the better right was a
routine matter at law that did not involve constitutional issues.
Below the surface, however, CartwrightI fundamentally misapplied the law and violated core constitutional guarantees when it granted
the city an expanding right. The Cartwright I holding awarded a right
where none had existed before. The historical evidence overwhelmingly
rebuts any contention that the city had an expanding water right
awarded along with its 1835 land grant. CartwrightI was thus no mere
adjudication of disputed rights, but an improper substitution of a valid
right by a spurious claim. In awarding Las Vegas a pueblo water right,
the Cartwright I court explicitly invoked the police power of the state.' 2'

118. Id. at 1046-47. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1, 72-12-1-, 72-12-18 (Michie 1994).

119. Compare such exclusion of the rights of vested appropriators with instances where
junior appropriators cannot divert water in times of drought. There the senior appropriator
has a better right, but is still limited to the terms of the appropriation. Under the pueblo
rights doctrine, a municipality, whether in times of drought or not, could divert to the
detriment of junior appropriators any and all waters from a stream necessary for its uses,
without compensation.

120. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20.
121. See Cartwright1, 343 P.2d at 668, where the court states:
There is present in the doctrine discussed the recognizable presence of lex
suprema, the police power, which furnishes answer to claims of confiscation
always present when private and public claims collide .... So, here, we
see in the Pueblo Rights doctrine the elevation of the public good over the
claim of a private right.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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By granting an expanding right to a state entity, invoking the police
power of the state, and extinguishing the vested property rights of other
water users, the court essentially performed an eminent domain action.
Yet even in eminent domain, the state must compensate a property owner
for the loss of property."
The New Mexico Supreme Court was itself called on to decide a
similar question of state action in Marion v. Quintana." Anna Marjon
owned property where the defendants, the ditch commissioners and the
mayordomo of the Sombrillo Community Ditch, had a fifteen foot ditch
easement." The defendants, acting pursuant to New Mexico statutory
authority, undertook to enlarge and reline the ditch."~ In doing so, they
widened the ditch beyond its historic boundaries, encroaching on the
plaintiff's land." The supreme court ruled that even under the statutocould not take private
ry right to modify the ditch, the defendants
27
property without just compensation.
The analogies between Cartwright I and Marjon are obvious. In
Marjon, the plaintiff had a vested property right under New Mexico law.
The CartwrightI plaintiffs had a vested property right under New Mexico
law. In Marion, the defendant wanted to expand its easement right,
diminishing the plaintiff's property interest pursuant to statutory
authority, yet without compensation. In Cartwright I, the defendant
sought to expand its water right, diminishing the plaintiffs' property
interest pursuant to a judicial doctrine that had never been the law in
New Mexico, yet without compensation.
Where one branch of government cannot constitutionally take
property without compensation, another branch is equally powerless to
act. Marjon raised the issue of uncompensated taking of property
pursuant to legislative authority. Cartwright I raised the issue of
uncompensated taking of property pursuant to judicial authority. One
action is unconstitutional in a legislative context; it cannot be constitutional in the judicial context.

N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 20.
123.484 P.2d 338 (N.M. 1971).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court was unequivocal in its holding:
The fact that ditch commissioners are given the right to alter, change the
location of, enlarge, extend, or reconstruct a ditch under the conditions set
forth in § 75-14-53, supra,cannot be construed as giving them authority to
take private property for these uses without just compensation, contrary
to Art. II, § 20, Constitution of New Mexico...
Id. at 498.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Understandably, a court of appeals might be reluctant to apply
such an analysis to a holding of a supreme court. Yet the need for
compensation for taking of water under the doctrine has been raised
before." The New Mexico Supreme Court, by overruling CartwrightI,
can quiet the constitutional difficulty introduced by the Cartwright I
holding.
The City's claim of a right created by its reliance on CartwrightI
The City of Las Vegas also argued that its reliance on Cartwright
I precluded the court of appeals from disturbing the city's right.'" The
city maintained that continuously diverting from the Gallinas river,
investing in a pipeline to nearby Storrie Lake, and foregoing from
purchasing other water rights amounted to interests which had become
a "rule of property. 1 '
The city derived its argument in part from three New Mexico
cases. In Duncan v. Brown,"" the court held that it would not disturb
unsound judicial decisions when they concern real property, finding that
reliance on an earlier property decision precluded overturning even an
erroneous ruling.'3 2 The supreme court again refused in Baca v. Chavez to upset a possibly questionable ruling M when many real property
135
transfers had occurred in reliance upon it." Finally, State v. Dority,

128. See LeCates, supra note 111, at 737.
Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868,875-76 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
129. State ex rel.
130. Id.
131. 139 P. 140 (N.M. 1914).
132. Id. The court only discussed application of such a rule to property adjudications
which have been relied on in subsequent transactions:
Judicial decisions, affecting title to real estate presumptively acquired in
reliance upon such decisions, should not be disturbed or departed from
except for the most cogent reasons, certainly not because of doubts as to
their soundness. If there should be a change, the legislature can make
it... with infinitely less derangement of titles than would follow a new
ruling of the Court, for the statutory regulations operate only in the future.
Id. at 141.
133. 252 P. 987 (N.M. 1927).
134. Id.
[The prior case's] mere unsoundness, even if so considered, is not sufficient
reason to overrule it It has been a rule of property in this state for ten
years. We must consider that attorneys have passed, and their clients have
accepted, title in reliance upon it. Litigation involving property rights has,
no doubt, been determined by it. A change in the rule, not merely
prospective, might cast doubt upon many titles. In such a case we are not
at liberty to overturn a former decision of this court, even if convinced it
is unsound.
Id.
at 989.
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a case litigating water rights, held that a nineteen year old decision
presumably relied on by purchasers of irrigated land should stand
regardless of the correctness of the decision.''
A parallel exists in California law to support the city's position.
The 1975 case reaffirming the pueblo water rights doctrine in California
is City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando.!" There, the supreme court,
sitting en banc, refused to reconsider the pueblo water rights doctrine,
basing its holding in substantial part on the extensive reliance Los
Angeles had placed on the doctrine while developing the necessary
infrastructure to bring water to the city.13
The court of appeals rejected the City of Las Vegas' argument.
First, Judge Apodaca held that since Cartwright I did not define which
uses of water were permissible under pueblo water rights, the city could
not have "reasonably relied on the doctrine for any use to which it has
put the water since CartwrightL 39 Second, the court of appeals found
that the city could not "prove that it made expenditures based solely on
its reliance that its claimed water rights existed.""4 Third, the court
distinguished Duncan, Baca, and Dority by pointing out that in those
cases, the supreme court had "noted that numerous parties, other than
just those involved in the litigation, had depended on the previous
decisions."' In the present case, the city did not show that anyone else
had relied on the Cartwright I decision." Therefore, this case did not
fall within the rationale of Duncan, Baca, and Dority.10 Finally, the court

135. 225 P.2d 1007 (N.M. 1950).

136. The Dority court dearly stated its concept of a rule of property:
There is another consideration which requires the affirmance of the trial
court's decree. The decision of Yeo v. Tweedy, [286 P.970 (N.M. 1930)) has
become a rule of property. In the nineteen years since that decision it may
be assumed that many thousands of acres of the one hundred thousand
irrigated with water from the Roswell Artesian basin and the valley fill
have been sold to purchasers who relied on that decision as determining
title to the right to use the water here involved, and the water rights to
which would be injured if Yeo v. Tweedy is overruled. Whether it stated the
correct rule of law (and we are of the opinion that it did), it is now a rule
of property that we will not disturb.
State v. Dority, 225 P.2d at 1019.
137. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975).

138. See id. at 1274, 1281-85. The City of Los Angeles had, among other acts, constructed
a 200 mile aqueduct to import water to Los Angeles. "Inimporting the water, plaintiff [City
of Los Angeles] relied on the pueblo right to retain priority in its original native supply
once this surplus was exhausted." Id. at 1283.
139. State ex rel. Martinez, 880 P.2d at 875.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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of appeals reasoned that even assuming a reliance on the part of the city,
two grounds existed for not following CartwrightI: the lack of a historical
basis for the doctrine and its clash with the rest of New Mexico water
law.14
On balance, the court of appeals correctly ruled on the reliance
argument. The court appropriately distinguished Duncan, Baca, and
Dority, since nowhere in this litigation is the argument raised that
subsequent purchasers of the city's water right relied on its validity
under CartwrightL The common thread in all three of these earlier cases
is not the mere reliance on a property right, but the actual or presumed
transfer of title to real property to purchasers who had relied on that
adjudicated right. It is unclear, however, why the court found no
applicable reliance as a result of the vagueness of the right adjudicated
in Cartwright L Presumably, the city could have relied on the right
regardless of the uses to which it put the Cartwright I water. On this
point, perhaps a remand to consider more closely the facts of the reliance
issue might have been appropriate.' Given the failure of the city to
prove sole reliance on the doctrine, however, even on remand the city
might not have overcome this weakness in its position. Furthermore, the
historical problems associated with the doctrine, its conflict with existing
New Mexico law, and the constitutional taking issue are all significant
bars to the survival of the doctrine, even if a court were to assume viable
reliance on the part of the city. Thus, the court of appeals appropriately
ruled that the city's possible reliance claim was not enough to justify
enshrining the bad law CartwrightI introduced in New Mexico.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court should decide State ex rel.
Martinez v. City of Las Vegas to settle uncertainty in the law. The court of
appeals was on solid substantive ground in its holding. The pueblo water
rights doctrine, created by California law to meet that state's circumstances, has no validity in New Mexico outside Cartwright L There is no

144. Id. at 876. The Duncan court had reserved an exception to the rule of not disturbing
property rights, saying that it would do so given sufficient cogent reasons. See supra note

132. The court of appeals here found those two reasons to be cogent. State ex rel. Martinez,
880 P.2d at 876.
145. See the opinion of Judge Hartz in this case, arguing for a remand "on the issue of

whether the City still possesses any rights arising from the Supreme Court decision in
Cartuwight L" State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d at 876 (Hartz, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Compare the reasoning of the court's holding on the
reliance argument with the reliance reasoning in City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975). There the court did not address specific uses of water
as pertaining to Los Angeles' reliance.
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historical basis for the doctrine, which is in direct conflict with settled
prior appropriation law. Furthermore, the doctrine unconstitutionally
allows the taking of private property without just compensation. Despite
these deficiencies in the Cartwright I holding, however, the court of
appeals took an unorthodox approach to shaping case law in New
Mexico. By expansively construing the holding of State v. Wilson, the
court of appeals might have intruded on the decision-making prerogatives of the supreme court. The New Mexico Supreme Court should
therefore use this case to both overrule Cartwright I and clarify the
procedural doubt introduced into New Mexico law.
Pierre L6vy

